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All Foundings Are Forced 
Arthur Isak Applbaum1 
    
1. On March 5, 2011, after its first meeting in Benghazi, the newly formed and 
self-appointed ―Transitional National Council of the Republic of Libya‖ 
proclaimed itself ―the only legitimate body representing the people of Libya and 
the Libyan state.‖2  Five days later, after consultations with a couple of defected 
Libyan diplomats who may have been freelancing, the French Foreign Ministry 
announced that France recognized the Transitional National Council as ―the 
legitimate representative of the Libyan people.‖3  The council was led by a man 
who, before the uprising, was Qaddafi’s minister of justice, and comprised an 
assortment of lawyers, businessmen, professors, and other defectors from the 
Libyan government.  Unlike its neighbor Egypt, Libya lacked much of an 
organized opposition before the seemingly spontaneous uprising of February 15.  
The mostly young protesters transformed themselves into loose bands of fighters 
without plan.  Their early successes in the eastern cities from Benghazi to Tobruk 
and in the towns surrounding Tripoli should be attributed to the early panic and 
disarray of Muammar Qaddafi’s loyalists as much as to the rebels’ unquestioned 
courage.  Three squabbling ex-generals claimed to command a few thousand 
  
1 Adams Professor of Democratic Values, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.  
Prepared for a conference at the University of Graz, Austria in May 2011.  I am grateful 
to Pranay Sanklecha for comments. Portions of this paper borrow, with modifications, 
from Arthur Isak Applbaum, ―Forcing a People to Be Free,‖ Philosophy & Public Affairs 35 
(2007), pp. 359-400.   
2 Transitional National Council of Libya, <http://ntclibya.org/english/about/>. 
3 France Diplomatie, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-
files_156/libya_283/libya-national-transitional-council-10.03.11_15202.html>.   2 
untrained, ill-equipped, ragtag fighters, along with perhaps one thousand army 
defectors, all the while disputing each other’s authority. 
The  de facto success of any popular uprising or coup d’état depends on the 
probability of reaching a self-fulfilling equilibrium: will enough actors judge 
quickly enough that the rebellion will succeed for them to risk joining in, thereby 
collectively assuring the success that each predicted?  The strategy of every 
rational revolutionary or junta therefore is to assemble, before reaching the fatal 
point of no return, as much of a winning coalition as possible without detection 
by the regime in power.  History perhaps will show this to be an overstatement, 
but the Libyan revolution at its start was no one’s rational strategy, much less the 
strategy of the worthy members-to-be of the Transitional National Council.  They 
did not plan the uprising, they did not trigger it, and—on the day that they 
announced themselves to be the only legitimate body representing the Libyan 
people—they did not control it.  On no plausible account of how a people or a 
state come to be represented could the council claim to have represented the 
Libyan people or state on the 5th of March: they were not rightful successors to 
authority on any account of pedigreed succession; they were not chosen in any 
procedure, either customary or newly invented, by the people they claimed to 
represent; they did not secure the basic rights and liberties of the people they 
claimed to represent; they were not better guides to the practical reasons that 
applied to individual Libyans than were those individuals themselves; they did 
not even control the territory of most of the people they claimed to represent.   
All this is so, not because the tyrant had some superior claim to pedigree, 
consent, rights protection, or normative guidance.  Had Qaddafi set sail to his 
Elba early in the uprising, leaving factional chaos behind, the council would have 
faced no lower hurdle of justification.  No Law of the Conservation of the 
General Will exists, such that legitimacy may neither be created nor destroyed,   3 
only changed from form to form.  So suppose that, whatever is the correct view 
of justified revolution against a tyrannical regime, Libya on March 5 was a 
legitimacy-free zone: a Hobbesian condition of nature, a Lockean state of war, a 
Kantian barbarism.  The claim to title of the Transitional National Council still 
appears to be unmoored. 
  Yet there was strategic logic in France’s early recognition of the council as 
the legitimate representative of the Libyan people: saying so might make it so.  
Under the right conditions, recognition of legitimacy also is self-fulfilling.  
Despite the rather vaporous existence of the Transitional National Council, its 
claim to speak for the revolution was widely accepted both at home and abroad.  
No other group arose to question its leadership.  Alas, France made its 
declaration just as the Qaddafi regime was regaining its footing, on the day that 
would turn out to be the rebels’ most extensive advance for quite some time.  
Qaddafi’s forces pushed the rebels back to the outskirts of Benghazi, triggering 
the UN Security Council’s authorization of a no-fly zone on March 17.  NATO 
airstrikes thwarted his advance on Benghazi but could not, from the air, turn the 
rebels into an effective fighting force.  On the factual ground, the conflict 
stalemated for quite some time.  Not until October 20, 2011, with the killing of 
Colonel Muamar Qaddafi, did Libya’s revolutionaries achieve their long-
anticipated military victory. 
On normative grounds, despite our deep admiration and empathy for 
those who rise up against tyranny, we must fret about how the normative power 
to govern Libya is created and conferred on this or any other ruling body or its 
successors.  The source of this anxiety is easily placed.  We hold two intuitions 
about legitimacy rather deeply, though not literally.  The first is that political 
legitimacy requires, in some sense, the consent of the governed.  The second is 
that political legitimacy is acquired only through proper pedigree or procedure.    4 
Together, we might call these intuitions the consensual pedigree folk theory.  Theory 
of course is too strong.  Few upon reflection still hold to John Locke’s idea that 
political societies are founded only upon the explicit consent of individuals who 
unanimously contract to institute procedures of governance by majority rule, but 
the twin intuitions still exert pull.  Hence the worry, for the Transitional Council 
of the Republic of Libya did not and could not rule with the consent of those it 
purported to govern, and did not and could not have acquired its powers 
through proper pedigree. 
 
2. Beginning with Kant, social contract accounts of political legitimacy have 
changed in two complementary but distinguishable ways: first, the ab ovo 
question of how a legitimate political order is founded has been replaced by the 
in medias res question of what makes an ongoing political order legitimate.  
Second, the condition of actual consent, and the consequent specification of a 
contractual primal scene, has been replaced by conditions of possible or 
hypothetical consent, and the consequent specification of a philosophically 
convincing model of idealized agreement.  The two developments are 
complementary, for once actual consent is seen as unnecessary (and perhaps 
insufficient) to ground political legitimacy, the search for both the normative 
specification of a legitimate founding and its historical moment may be called 
off.  Says Rawls, ―Political society is not, and cannot be, an association.  We do 
not enter it voluntarily.  Rather we simply find ourselves in a particular political 
society at a particular moment in time.‖4  Indeed, for Kant, the search must be 
  
4 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 4.   5 
called off.  ―A people should not inquire with any practical aim in view into the 
origin of the supreme authority to which it is subject.‖5  
  For both Kant and Rawls, the double move away from actual consent at 
some historical founding moment is no concession to realist politics.  Since 
almost all of the earth’s inhabitants already live in ongoing political societies, the 
in medias res question is our question, and since almost all of the earth’s 
inhabitants have no real alternative to living out their lives within the political 
society in which they are born, let alone the alternative of living outside of any 
political society, voluntary actual consent is not an option.  The claim is not that 
most inhabitants do not consent, or will not consent.  To have the conditions of 
legitimacy influenced by such facts indeed would be a concession, and therefore 
be political in the wrong way.  But if consent is a transaction between 
independent persons, rather than simply an approving mental state, inhabitants 
cannot give genuine consent: the background conditions make unforced consent 
impossible for most of us. 
    
3.  This paper takes political legitimacy to be the moral power to govern—a 
power that, correlatively, incurs some sort of moral liability upon those properly 
subject to it.  To govern, to have a moral power, and to be subject to a moral 
liability hardly are transparent ideas, but it is not my purpose to explicate them 
fully here.  Elsewhere, I have argued that the moral liability generated by 
legitimate governance need not always be moral obligation, but could sometimes 
be a less demanding change in the subject’s normative situation such as a change 
  
5 The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Ak. 6: 318, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. 
Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996).   6 
in the moral rights,  immunities, and social facts affecting the subject.6  But the 
argument here does not turn on the correctness of that claim.  All that I need to 
say here is that the moral power to govern is something more than merely the 
moral permission to coerce.7 
  Political legitimacy is a three-place relation: A legitimately governs B in 
context C, where C specifies the domain and scope of A’s jurisdiction with 
respect to B.  An account of political legitimacy needs to explain how an agent’s 
moral power to govern attaches to a particular subject in a particular context.  
The folk theory’s answer is that each individual subject consents (in some way) 
to be governed by those agents who have the proper pedigree (in some way), 
where properness traces back to some earlier collective agreements among some 
predecessors.  The two prongs, consent and pedigree, need each other: consent 
unbounded by pedigree is unstable; pedigree free of consent is oppressive.   
When left underspecified, the folk theory provides some sorry comfort in 
medias res.  We consent to pedigreed procedures to which our predecessors 
consented, subject to pedigreed procedures to which their predecessors 
consented.  It is consent to pedigreed procedures all the way down.  The folk 
theory, however, faces a sharp problem ab ovo: which came first, the consensual 
chicken or the procedural egg?  Despite the three great social contractarians who 
precede Kant, the procedure of majority rule is not self-justifying (though 
Hobbes is more alert to the problem than Locke or Rousseau).  There was no 
  
6 Arthur Isak Applbaum, ―Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey,‖ Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 38 (2010), pp. 215-239. 
7 So I agree with Joseph Raz, against Robert Ladenson, that legitimate authority is not 
merely a permission, and accept John Simmons’s distinction between justification and 
legitimacy (though I draw that distinction differently).    7 
proper procedure by which the Continental Congress assembled in Philadelphia 
in 1776 could agree on a proper procedure for declaring independence.  
Why, after Kant and Rawls, do we need to answer the question of ab ovo 
legitimacy at all?  One reason is pragmatic:  Libyas happen.  Of the 193 current 
members of the United Nations, only two existed as independent states before 
the publication of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals in 1797 and have not since had 
ruptures in governance caused by revolution, coup, or occupation.  The more 
important reason is philosophical: as Kant understood well, thinking about the 
contradictions of legitimacy ab ovo in abstraction from existing political 
institutions is one way to construct an account of legitimacy in medias res. 
 
4.  I wish to present an alternative to the folk theory of political legitimacy that 
acknowledges the tug of our intuitions about consent and pedigreed procedure, 
but avoids at least some of the puzzles that arise when one tries to get specific 
about what is meant by consent and pedigree.  To develop the view, I will begin 
by offering a merely suggestive formulation, and then tighten it up a bit as I go 
along.  My claim is that an account of political legitimacy must solve the puzzle 
of how free moral agents can remain free even when subjected to coercive 
governance.  The solution, roughly, is that free moral agents remain free only 
when they are governed by a free group agent of which they are constituent 
members.  A legitimately governs B only when A governs B in such a way that 
both A and B remain free moral agents over time.  This is so only when A’s 
governance of B realizes and protects B’s freedom over time, and this in turn is so 
only when A is a free group agent that counts a free B as a member.  Over 
grownups of sound mind, the only legitimate governance is collective self-
governance.  My task is to specify this old commonplace in an illuminating way. 
   8 
5.  What is a moral agent?  On this account, a moral agent is an entity that is the  
proximate locus of respect and responsibility: an agent can make genuine moral 
claims on others and others can make genuine moral claims on an agent.  I take it 
to be a conceptual truth that anything that can be held to be properly responsible 
is (or at one time was) capable of action.  To count as an action (and not merely 
an event or a behavior), the agent who performed it must have three capacities or 
their functional equivalent:  (1) considering: the capacity to respond to 
considerations for action, endorsing some and rejecting others; (2) willing: the 
capacity to choose to act (or not act); and (3) doing: the capacity to behave in 
ways guided by these considerations and choices.8  Only entities that have these 
three capacities of considering, willing, and doing, and whose behaviors follow 
from the exercise of these capacities, can be said to have the unity required to be 
agents capable of action. 
 
6. What is a free moral agent?  For our purposes, agents must be sufficiently free 
in both internal and external senses of freedom.  The conception of internal 
freedom put to use here is freedom as competence.  Competence simply is a 
degree of autonomy, but to avoid confusion with thicker and more demanding 
accounts of autonomy, such as Kant’s, I shall the use a less lofty term.  To be a 
competent agent is to have the three capacities of action to some adequate 
  
8 Considering requires more than simply responding to stimuli or desires.  It demands a 
degree of reflection that Harry Frankfurt captures with his account of second order 
volitions, or at least what Agnieszka Jaworska captures with her account of valuing.  See 
Harry G. Frankfurt, ―Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person‖ (1971), in The 
Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 11–25, and 
Agnieszka Jaworska, ―Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the 
Capacity to Value,‖ Philosophy & Public Affairs 28 (1999), pp. 105-138.   9 
degree.  Note that room is left over for an impaired agent: one who has enough 
minimal capacity for considering, willing, and doing to count as some sort of 
agent, rather than merely an event-generator like the wind or a lower animal, but 
not enough capacity to count as a competent agent.  So an internally free agent is 
a competent agent. 
  Although Kant’s conception of inner freedom is too demanding to follow 
here, his conception of external freedom is especially fitting.  Agents have 
external freedom when they are independent of the domination of others.9  
External freedom, on this view, is not a matter of being unconstrained by 
circumstances, so that the fewer options one has the less freedom one has, 
whatever the source of constraint.  Rather, the conception of external freedom 
used here considers a person to be free if his choices are not subject to the control 
of another person.  External freedom is violated when one person’s innate 
powers or acquired means are destroyed or unilaterally appropriated by another 
person’s choices.   
On these conceptions of internal and external freedom, we now say that A 
legitimately governs B only when A governs B in such a way that both A and B 
remain competent and independent moral agents over time.  This is so only when 
A’s governance of B realizes and protects B’s competence and independence over 
time, and this in turn is so only when A is a competent and independent group 
agent that counts a competent and independent B as a member.   
 
7.  What is a group agent?  Note that the account of agency above made no 
reference to mental states, so need not be restricted to a natural person with a 
  
9 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Ak 6: 237).  Here I follow the interpretation of Arthur 
Ripstein, Force and Freedom (Harvard University Press, 2009).   10 
wet brain between her ears.  A group is capable of unified action if, together, it 
possesses in requisite measure the three capacities of considering, willing, and 
doing.  I want nothing to do with spooky accounts of the general will here.  A 
group agent is not a metaphysical entity, and collective willing is not a 
psychological state in some group mind.  Yet neither is a group agent a simple 
aggregation of the preferences of individuals.  To be fully capable of competent 
shared agency, individuals have to be properly constituted, incorporated, 
represented, or personated.  A natural individual is capable of agency, of willing 
ends, when there is a unity of the self, the capacity for reflecting on desires and 
for endorsing some and not others, for making choices, and for engaging in 
behaviors that are guided by one’s considerations and choices.  When a collection 
of individuals has this unity of will and capacity for second-order reflection, it is 
capable of group action and what comes along with action: the group itself is a 
proper subject for moral evaluation.  (The conditions under which such 
evaluation properly distributes to the individual constituent actors is a further 
question.)  Without a shared will, there are only the individual wills of 
individual persons, which may show statistical regularities, may be coordinated 
in various ways, and which always result in some vector that is the consequence 
of individual actions, but none of this makes for shared agency.  To use Christine 
Korsgaard’s image, a bag filled with mice will move, but it will not act.  This is 
the difference between the results of a public opinion poll and the results of an 
election: a public opinion poll is a mere aggregation of individual preferences.  
An election (when the conditions for its legitimacy are met) is a performative, the 
action of a shared agent. 
 
8.  Can there be normative groups, understood as groups that are bearers of 
respect and responsibility, and if so, what properties must they have?  First, if the   11 
idea of a normative group is to be taken seriously, then all of the moral claims a 
normative group can make and all of the moral claims that can be made against 
it cannot merely be direct pass-throughs for the separate and several moral 
claims by and on the natural individual persons who make up the normative 
group.  If that were so, talk of a normative group would simply be a convenient 
shorthand, a manner of speaking. 
  Yet the idea of a normative group should not be taken seriously in the 
wrong way, and be given moral standing unconnected to the moral standing of 
the natural persons that constitute it.10  In ways that are often complex, claims 
against a normative group distribute into claims of some sort against at least 
some of its members; claims against one set of individual members sometimes 
generate claims against the normative group as a whole, and these in turn may 
distribute onto a different set of individual members; at least some claims by 
individual members generate claims by the normative group; and at least some 
of the claims of individuals can be discharged by satisfying claims made by 
normative group (even though the substance of the claim of the natural person 
may fail to have been met). 
  In short, if normative groups are possible, any normative status they have 
must be in virtue of the normative status of natural persons.  If groups in some 
measure are owed respect and can be held responsible in some ways, this is 
because they are made up of natural persons who are owed respect and can be 
  
10 So, although a normative group is not merely valued instrumentally, the source of its 
value is extrinsic.  Think, for example, of a family heirloom or historical artifact that is 
neither beautiful nor expensive.  On this distinction between the source of value and 
ways of valuing, see Christine M. Korsgaard, ―Two Distinctions in Goodness,‖ in 
Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 249–74.   12 
held responsible.  But there is no simple reduction or one-to-one correspondence 
from the claims attached to persons and the claims attached to groups. 
 
9.  A complete account of group agency would show how individual capacities 
for and instances of considering, willing, and doing can combine to constitute an 
entity with sufficient unity of the right sort to count as an agent that itself 
considers, wills, and acts.  I do not have a complete account of agency, individual 
or collective, but I have already offered one necessary condition: agents must be 
sufficiently free in both the internal and external senses of freedom.  They must 
be competent enough and independent enough.  A natural agent must have an 
adequate set of freedoms necessary to have the three capacities of considering, 
willing, and doing, and a collective agent must be made up of sufficiently free 
natural agents whose individual capacities for considering, willing, and doing 
mesh in a way that renders the collectivity sufficiently free to have the capacities 
of considering, willing, and doing.  Similarly, a free natural agent must be 
independent—that is, not dominated by the choices of others—and a free group 
agent must be made up of undominated natural agents whose individual choices 
and actions mesh in a way that renders the collectivity independent.  Internal 
and external freedom are connected in the following way: at least some of the 
rights and liberties that are necessary for freedom as independence also are 
constitutive or instrumental preconditions for freedom as competence. 
  A natural individual can fail to be a moral agent in degree, hence the 
notion of an impaired or incompetent person.  Children and those who are 
demented, mentally ill, or mentally retarded are still persons.  Similarly, shared 
agency can fail in degree.  So the account of normative groups would also specify 
the minimal capacities for considering, willing, and doing that make a 
collectivity an agent at all, and, as with individual natural agents, specify the   13 
thresholds that distinguish competent from incompetent collective agency.  An 
aggregation of individuals that does not meet even minimal threshold conditions 
does not count as a shared agent at all, and so does not count as a normative 
group at all.  A collective agent can fail the test of sufficient freedom, either 
because the natural persons that make it up are not sufficiently free, or because 
their individual capacities for considering, willing, and doing have not combined 
in the ways needed to form a collective agent that is sufficiently free.  Something 
similar goes for external freedom: natural agents can be independent—that is, 
undominated by the unilateral choice of others—in both degree and in kind, in 
some contexts but not in others.  So too for the group agents they constitute.  So 
not all normative groups are already free. 
 
10.  So far, I have said little about what the conditions for shared agency are.  
How does an aggregation of individual ―I‖s somehow go POOF! and become 
―We,‖ a unified moral agent capable of shared action and that is the proper 
proximate subject of moral appraisal?  Two sorts of answers are needed. One 
answer should be sufficiently general so that, when we look at aggregations as 
diverse as marriages, string ensembles, baseball teams, street demonstrations, 
universities, hospitals, business enterprises, professions, organized crime 
families, ethnic groups, political societies, and governments, we are able to say 
which have the capacity for shared agency and which do not.  Then we need an 
answer that is sufficiently specific to the kind of aggregation in question, so that 
we can specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for success as a shared 
agent of that kind.  Conditions for succeeding at ―playing the Mendelssohn 
octet‖ may be different than conditions for succeeding at ―amending the 
Constitution.‖   14 
  For A to be a group agent that counts B as a member, two sorts of 
conditions need to be satisfied.  First, we need constitutive conditions: in what 
way is A formed to possess the capacities for moral agency?  Second, we need 
conscriptive conditions: why and how does A’s power to govern come to apply to 
B?   One might have thought that, if the answer to the question of legitimate 
governance is collective self-governance, constitution and conscription are not 
separate ideas: a group agent simply is constituted by its members.  Not so.  
Though constitution and conscription are simultaneous, at least initially, they are 
conceptually distinct achievements that have conceptually distinct success 
conditions.  To see this, think of how a new member joins an existing group.  
Even if one says that a group agent is reconstituted each time a new member 
joins, different members can attach to the group differently. 
 
How are group agents constituted?  Unified, shared agency can come about in at 
least three general ways. Every plausible account of which I know follows these 
three routes, either singly or in combination. 
 
11. Meshed Aims and Plans.  The structurally simplest route to the constitution of a 
group agent is through the intermeshing of aims and plans.11  Very roughly, a 
―we‖ is formed that plays Mendelssohn when each of us aims to play the piece 
  
11 Michael E. Bratman has what I think is the most plausible account in Faces of Intention 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999), chaps. 5–8.  I loosely follow his view.  Margaret 
Gilbert has written the seminal works on this topic, but I am not persuaded by her 
holism or by her views about how involuntary commitments are formed.  See Living 
Together (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), and Sociality and Responsibility (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000).   15 
together, knowing that each of us has that aim, and with each of us planning to 
(and knowing that each plans to) adjust our actions (tempo, pitch, dynamics, 
phrasing) to mesh with the actions of others as necessary to support each other to 
achieve our shared aim.  Because no organizational or procedural structure needs 
to be relied upon for the intermeshing of aims and plans, the paradigm cases are 
face-to-face, small scale, and synchronic (although more complicated collective 
agency is not precluded).  Note how this simple collective agent succeeds at 
being the proximate locus of responsibility.  The octet itself is a proper subject of 
evaluation, to be praised or criticized, and this praise and criticism to some 
extent distributes onto the individual players in a way that is not simply an 
evaluation of the individual contribution of each.  This is captured by locutions 
such as ―We did it!‖ after a good performance: ―we,‖ all together, the weakest 
player and the strongest, did one thing, ―it.‖  But note too that, if the 
intermeshing of aims and plans is the only route to shared agency relied upon 
here, if the eight string players are a subset of a larger chamber orchestra, the 
woodwinds and horns who stayed home did not ‖play the Mendelssohn octet.‖ 
For the stay-at-home players to be authors of this action in any way, so that some 
sort of responsibility for the performance could distribute on to them, recourse to 
one of the other two routes to shared agency is needed. 
 
12. Representation.  The second route to the constitution of a group agent relies 
upon representation and impersonation.  Hobbes of course is the great 
propounder of the view that unity of agency is achieved only through the unity   16 
of the representative.12  A shared agent is formed and can act as one only if each 
of many individuals severally authorizes a person to represent each, or, in 
Hobbes’s phrase, to impersonate each.13  The core idea here is that, under certain 
conditions, A can act for B in a way that makes B the author of the action, and so 
the proper locus of responsibility for the action.  Via this route, collective agency 
comes about when one agent is authorized to act in the same way on behalf of 
each of many.  There need not be coordination or intermeshing of the plans of the 
many, or even common knowledge of the multiple representation (although one 
might make authorization contingent on the authorization of others, in which 
case common knowledge would be necessary).  Notice how the route of 
intermeshing plans and the route of representation can combine.  A multitude of 
unmeshed individuals can be represented by a team with intermeshed plans; or 
  
12 ―A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, 
Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in 
particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that 
maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one 
Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood, in Multitude.‖ Thomas Hobbes, 
Leviathan (1651), ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 16, ―Of 
Persons, Authors, and Things Personated.‖ 
13 Unity in the representative is readily understood when the representative is a natural 
moral agent with one wet brain.  Had Hobbes insisted that any other unity is impossible, 
his argument for monarchy would have been conceptual.  Instead, Hobbes allows that 
the representative can be an assembly of men, whose unity is achieved by majority rule: 
there are more than enough majority votes to ―destroy‖ all the minority votes, so the 
excess speaks with one voice.  Hobbes will need this account of majority rule later to 
make his initial covenant work, but it comes at the price of weakening the contrast 
between unity and multitude.   17 
we can together, through an intermeshed plan, appoint a single natural 
representative to act for us. 
 
13. Procedure.  The third route to the constitution of a group agent relies on 
procedures, practices, or organizational structures.  The various capacities of 
considering, willing, and doing are functionally accomplished by the combined 
efforts of many, though perhaps no one natural person has considered, willed, or 
acted in a way that matches the shared action.  Indeed, one tempting test of 
whether a procedure constitutes a shared agent is that the outcomes of the 
procedure meet some appealing standards of rationality even when the collective 
choice is at odds with the individual choices appealingly aggregated.14  A 
mechanism that produced an authoritative decision or action out of (and 
sensitive to) practical inputs of individual agents would be such a procedure.  A 
shared action produced by a procedure could be relatively simple, such as 
friends choosing a movie by majority vote, or as complex as the rendering of law 
in a legal system in which the admission of evidence, factual determinations 
given the evidence, legal rulings given the factual findings, and appellate review 
  
14 Philip Pettit has fruitfully pursued this line of argument.  See especially 
―Responsibility Incorporated,‖ Ethics, 117 (2007), pp. 171–201; ―Groups with Minds of 
Their Own,‖ in Socializing Metaphysics, ed. Frederick Schmitt (Rowman & Littlefield, 
2004), pp. 167–93; and Christian List and Philip Pettit, ―Aggregating Sets of Judgments: 
An Impossibility Result,‖ Economics and Philosophy, 18 (2002), 89–110.  For a precursor, 
see Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis (Addison-Wesley, 1968), who relies on a result later 
published in Aanund Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser, ―The Impossibility of Bayesian 
Group Decisionmaking with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values,‖ Econometrica, 
47 (1979), 1321–36.   18 
given this and other precedential legal rulings are produced by many actors, not 
one of whom may will the outcome for a consistent set of factual and legal 
reasons.  
  
14. To illustrate how a procedure can constitute a group agent that rationally 
makes choices that no natural member would make, consider a hypothetical.  
Suppose the Transitional National Council is considering, before he is captured 
and killed, whether to put Colonel Qaddafi on trial in absentia for war crimes, 
and suppose the decision depends on three considerations:  Does the Council 
have lawful jurisdiction?   Will international allies support a trial?  Will 
remaining Qaddafi loyalists in the rebel-controlled territories remain peaceful, or 
turn violent?   A trial will proceed only if all three questions are answered in the 
affirmative.  Three council members are to make this decision: the justice 
minister, the foreign minister, and the defense minister.  For each of the three 
questions, one of the ministers answers no, but the other two answer yes, as 
presented in Table 1.   
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TABLE 1.  GROUP AGENCY CONSTITUTED BY PROCEDURE: MAJORITY RULE 
 
TRY 
QADDAFI? 
Lawful 
Jurisdiction? 
International 
Support? 
Loyalists 
Peaceful? 
Individual 
Judgment: 
Try? 
Justice 
Minister 
NO  YES  YES  NO 
Foreign 
Minister 
YES  NO  YES  NO 
Defense 
Minister 
YES  YES  NO  NO 
Group 
Judgment by 
Criterion 
YES  YES  YES  Group 
Decision? 
 
On the individual judgment of each minister, Qaddafi should not be tried, 
so if the decision procedure were to aggregate individual conclusions, the 
judgment would be unanimous: no trial.  Instead, the decision procedure is to 
render a collective judgment on each of the three considerations by majority rule.  
Since two of the three answer yes to each question, the group renders a judgment 
that Qaddafi should be tried.  Some may think this conclusion paradoxical or 
even irrational, but there is another interpretation: the result confirms the 
existence of group agency, for here is a rational decisionmaking procedure 
demonstrating the capacity for considering and willing that produces a judgment 
of the group that does not match the judgment of any single natural agent. 
  Group agency constituted by procedure does not depend on majority rule 
for the choice of procedure.  Suppose instead that the procedure followed by the 
Council is a division of labor, so that each minister determines the answer to the 
question under his area of expertise.  Change as well the answers the ministers   20 
give to the three questions, so that each minister answers yes to the question in 
his area of expertise, but no to the other two questions, as presented in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2.  GROUP AGENCY CONSTITUTED BY PROCEDURE: DIVISION OF LABOR 
 
TRY 
QADDAFI? 
Lawful 
Jurisdiction? 
International 
Support? 
Loyalists 
Peaceful? 
Individual 
Judgment: 
Try? 
Justice 
Minister 
YES  NO  NO  NO 
Foreign 
Minister 
NO  YES  NO  NO 
Defense 
Minister 
NO  NO  YES  NO 
Group 
Judgment by 
Criterion 
YES  YES  YES  Group 
Decision? 
 
Again, the group judgment is to proceed with the trial, since each minister 
answers the question in his area of expertise in the affirmative, even though the 
individual judgment of each minister is not to proceed. 
Complex instances of shared agency typically will rely on all three routes 
of constitution.  A corporation or association might form through the 
intermeshing of the aims and plans of its founders, appoint representatives to 
make decisions through procedures, and then delegate the implementation of 
plans to intermeshed teams of workers.  To make sense of ―amending the 
Constitution‖ as an act of a shared agent, the web of intermeshed aims, 
representations, and procedures would have to be even more elaborate. 
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15.  What are the conditions for conscription?  For each of these routes to the 
constitution of a group agent, we must ask what gives it its authority in Hobbes’s 
sense: what makes any particular natural agent an author of the group agent’s  
actions, and so a candidate for distributed responsibility?  The mere existence of 
a procedure is not sufficient to create a shared agent out of those natural agents 
whose practical capacities and functionings are taken to be inputs.  Your 
neighbors may, to your surprise, announce a procedure whereby each house on 
the block is to be painted the color preferred by the majority, and under that 
procedure, after duly taking your fondness for blue into account, the color of 
your house is to be changed from blue to yellow.  Yet surely something more 
than the counting of your preference as an input must tie you to this procedure 
before you assume any authorship in or responsibility for the alleged shared 
agent that has arrived on your doorstep with cans of yellow paint.  If instead of 
employing a procedure, your neighbors appointed as representative a natural 
agent to make the neighborhood painting decisions, what is she to you?  Or if a 
neighbor appears with a couple of yellow paintbrushes in one hand and a 
shotgun in the other, you may find it prudent to join him in painting your house 
yellow and—one eye on the gun—take pains to do it right, meshing your plans 
with his.  Although you would be taking the action of painting your house 
yellow, you would not, in any normatively important sense, have formed a 
shared agent to paint your house yellow.15 
  
15 What are we to say about string players in a concentration camp ordered to play 
Mendelssohn for the guards?  Autonomous individual action can be nested inside a 
generally coercive background.  An individual cellist ordered to play the Bach solo 
suites for the guards may be forced to do something she would not voluntarily choose to 
do, but, against that forced background, she may out of defiant pride or simple pleasure   22 
  A natural agent can be conscripted into constituting a shared agent, and 
so share authorship in a shared agent’s actions, in three ways.  The first is if the 
natural agent, under uncoerced and informed circumstances, consents to 
constitute a group agent in this way for this purpose.  Second, voluntary action 
short of consent could constitute participation in a collective agent if a version of 
the fair play principle applies, in which the natural agent voluntarily accepts the 
benefits of a mutually advantageous and fair cooperative venture under 
                                                                                                                                                 
amid misery decide to exercise the discretion that remains hers to play her best, and 
then, again within limits, she is a responsible competent agent.  So too, eight prison 
musicians may form a locally autonomous group agent whose purpose is instrumental 
survival, or defiant pride, or a bit of happiness amid the misery. They do not form a 
collective agent, however, with the guards. Is a collective agent formed with a guard who 
also is a good violinist and orders that the prisoners play with him?  Under some 
circumstances and for some circumscribed purposes, yes.  If, nested inside the larger 
coercive background, the prisoners have and exercise local autonomy in performance 
with the guard, then for purposes of aesthetic praise and criticism, they are acting 
collectively with him.  If the guard also is a musical bully who demands obedience note 
by note under threat of punishment, then no.  Either way, the prisoners do not form an 
all-purpose group agent with the guard that is responsible, as a group agent, for all of 
the consequences of the forced performance.  Suppose the performance also served as 
the signal to commence atrocities elsewhere in the camp.  Performing under those 
circumstances may or may not be excusable, but this is a direct assessment of 
responsibility to be made of each musician taken as an individual natural agent, rather 
than an assessment of distributed responsibility for the action of a group agent.  Group 
agency is a normative ascription that supervenes on some descriptive facts, but is not 
itself a descriptive fact of the matter.   23 
conditions where the benefit could have been refused.16  The third way to 
conscript a natural agent is if commitment to constitute a shared agent in 
something like this way for this purpose is a practical necessity, in that it is either 
constitutive of or a precondition for acting upon the natural agent’s prior 
uncoerced and informed commitments, and the natural agent, knowing that this 
is so, either cannot or will not give up these prior commitments.  These are 
demanding conditions for authorship, but such demandingness is needed to 
attach a natural agent to an entity with the moral standing and powers of a 
group agent.  Recall that a group agent is a proximate locus of respect and 
responsibility that both bears in some ways the moral claims made by and 
against its constituent members and distributes in some ways over its constituent 
members the moral claims made by and against it. 
 
16.  Three conditions for constitution and three conditions for conscription give 
nine ways of attaching a natural agent to a group agent, as shown on the grid in 
Table 3.  I have suggestively filled each cell with a collectivity that arguably is a 
normative group that arguably is constituted and conscripted in one of the nine 
  
16 John Rawls presents the principle of fairness, called in an earlier article the principle of 
fair play, in Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 108–14, 342–50, where 
he credits H.L.A. Hart.  Rawls originally proposed the fair play principle as a way to 
ground political obligation in voluntary action other than consent, and succeeds in this 
task better than Locke’s tacit consent.  Still, Rawls later conceded that ordinary citizens 
do not accept benefits voluntarily.  I use a modification of the fair play principle to 
establish moral permissions, rather than obligations, in Ethics for Adversaries (Princeton 
University Press, 1999), pp. 113-135.  Here, the fair play idea is used to ground 
normative powers rather than permissions.   24 
ways.  I invite you to disagree with me.  You may not be convinced that all of 
these nine groups are normative groups, bearers of respect and responsibility in 
virtue of their capacities for competent and independent shared agency.  Or you 
may disagree that they constitute shared agents by the route I suggest, or 
conscript members as authors in the way that I say.  You might be correct on all 
counts.  I have not given precise criteria for distinguishing free normative groups 
from impaired normative groups from groups that are not agents at all.  Also, 
complex group agents may be constituted in nested levels, so that the unity of 
agency is built up out of a combination of meshed aims and plans, 
representation, and procedure.  So too, conscription of members can occur by 
either consent, fair play, or practical necessity for different members, and for 
some members conscription may be overdetermined.  So I invite you to fill out 
the grid your way. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
     25 
TABLE 3.  CONSTITUTION AND CONSCRIPTION 
 
 
Meshed Aims 
and Plans  Representation  Procedure 
Consent  string quartet 
 symphony 
orchestra  legislature 
Fair Play  ocean fishery  labor union  jury 
Practical 
Necessity  lifeboat  army  electorate 
 
 
17.  The kind of shared agency that is of greatest interest to us, of course, is 
political agency.  Political action has profound effects on the freedom and 
interests of those subject to it because it nearly always involves coercion, and 
seeks to change the normative status of its subjects by imposing duties or 
liabilities.  Because of these high moral stakes, the conditions for successfully 
constituting a political ―We‖ from a multitude of ―I‖s are going to have more 
moral content than what it takes to constitute a string ensemble.  For how can a 
political people be my people unless, in some way, whoever speaks and acts for 
the people speaks and acts for me, representing in a morally adequate way both 
my will and my basic interests across the broad range of freedoms and interests 
that governments claim the right to regulate? 
  When the collective agent in question claims the normative power to 
coerce its constituent natural agents, the criterion that these natural agents be 
sufficiently free is threatened.  Governments, by imposing and enforcing laws, 
appear to restrict the freedoms of the governed.  So governments must either   26 
show that these restrictions on freedom nonetheless leave the governed 
sufficiently free, or show that the enactment and enforcement of law does not, 
despite appearances, actually restrict freedom.  One strategy for showing that 
restrictions on freedom leave natural agents sufficiently free is to show that 
restrictions are for the sake of realizing and protecting these same freedoms, for 
there is no condition of anarchy or other scheme of government under which 
these freedoms would be more inviolable or less violated, and so no other 
condition under which natural agents in general would have greater capacities 
for agency.  One strategy for showing that apparently coercive law does not 
restrict freedom is to show how the subject of law can also be, from some 
normatively appropriate point of view, its willing author who therefore is not 
coerced. These are not two separable strategies, however, but two turns of the 
same justificatory argument.  One of the central questions of modern political 
philosophy is how, if at all, collective self-governance is compatible with 
individual freedom.  The correct answer, I believe, has both a substantive and a 
procedural component, because it needs to address agents both from their 
perspectives as subjects of law and their perspectives as authors of law.  The 
agent viewed as the subject of coercive law must be given adequate justification, 
and the most promising strategy of justification is to show that equal and fully 
adequate freedom for all requires such limits on the freedom of each.  The agent 
viewed as the author of coercive law must be free enough in the relevant ways to 
count as an author.  Only if individuals are free enough to count as authors can 
the collective body constitute a shared agent.  How free is free enough?  No more 
constrained than is necessary to guarantee other constituent members of the 
collective body the freedoms they need to have the capacity to be authors.  To 
establish that subjects also are authors, we do not look for free founding 
moments; even if such foundings were not myths, they would not by themselves   27 
do the job needed.  Rather, we look for virtuous circles in which subjects are free 
enough to have the capacity to be authors of collective acts, procedures, and 
institutions that realize and protect the freedoms that make them free enough to 
have the capacity to be authors. 
 
18.  I have been offering necessary conditions for collective political agency, but 
notice that these conditions do double duty as criteria for a normative conception 
of political legitimacy.  This should come as no surprise.  If the concept of 
political legitimacy is, roughly, the normative power to govern, then one 
plausible account of the criteria for the legitimacy of a government is that only 
governments constituted as shared agents authored by their subjects have the 
right to rule those subjects, because only then is the puzzle of how we can remain 
self-governing when governed by others solved.  Yet note that, if the account of 
shared agency above is correct, then the correct account of political legitimacy 
has substantive as well as procedural requirements.  Only free enough natural 
agents can constitute a shared agent, and no procedure can make a natural agent 
free enough who is not free enough already.  This is why, to be legitimate, 
procedures of governance must be constrained by substantive preconditions (for 
example, constitutional rights that limit majority rule). 
  On the conception of political legitimacy that I believe is correct, the test of 
legitimate government is two-pronged, just as the test of shared political agency 
is two-pronged.  There needs to be an adequate connection between the 
governors and the governed (the procedural prong), and there needs to be 
adequate protection of at least basic human rights (the substantive prong).  At a 
minimum, legitimacy requires the political freedom and basic protection that are 
constitutive of or instrumentally necessary for the individual moral agency of the 
members.  Hence, the criterion offered earlier, applied to political society:  A   28 
necessary condition for a free (enough) people is that it be made up of free (enough) 
persons.  We do not have to be too precise about the thresholds here.  Perhaps 
something less than democracy will satisfy the political freedom prong, and 
perhaps something less than the full complement of liberal rights will satisfy the 
human rights prong.  But on no plausible normative account of group agency 
and therefore of legitimacy does a tyrannical regime that recognizes no 
constraints on the arbitrary will of the tyrant and that systematically violates 
basic human rights personify the people it rules. 
 
19.  Social contract theory advanced under Kant and then Rawls when it let go of 
just-so stories about ab ovo foundings.  Nonetheless, the world presents us with 
the chickens and eggs of legitimate governance.  Was France (that normative 
group represented by Nicholas Sarkozy) to send the rebel diplomats home 
empty-handed or with the prize of recognition?  We could say that, on March 10,  
it is too early for the question of legitimacy to arise.  Libya either has returned to 
a state of nature or has never left it, there is no way to legitimately bootstrap 
oneself to legitimate governance, and all now is domination.  We may predict 
whether a faction of dominators will triumph, we may predict whether a faction, 
once in empirical power, will treat the residents of Libya harshly or leniently, 
and so we may have reason to back one faction over another on humanitarian 
grounds.  We may even predict which faction is more likely to satisfy the 
conditions of free group agency, and so legitimacy, in the future, and that gives 
us further reason to support its struggle.  But being the best candidate for 
legitimate governance no more makes one legitimate than being the best 
candidate for president makes one president.   
  We might, however, be able to do more than just predict the outcome of a 
struggle over governance.  We may be able to predict the course through the   29 
routes of constitution and conscription that the likely winner is likely to take.  
And perhaps there are conditions under which a possible course that cascades 
through the routes of constitution and conscription is self-enacting: early 
successes do not merely predict later successes, but make it the case that later 
success has already happened.  In Table 4, consider again our nine-cell grid, this 
time filled in with potential group agents in the Libyan rebellion. 
 
 TABLE 4.  CONSTITUTION AND CONSCRIPTION IN LIBYA 
 
  Meshed Aims 
and Plans 
Representation  Procedure 
Consent  prominent 
rebels 
Benghazi civil 
servants  
Transitional 
Council 
Fair Play  demonstrators  rebel army units  rebel army 
officers 
Practical 
Necessity 
besieged towns  all Libyans as 
subjects 
all Libyans as 
citizens 
 
20.  Begin with the structurally simplest route to group agency, constitution via 
meshed aims and plans.  The surprising success of street demonstrations 
prompted a number of high level defections from Qaddafi’s government, the 
return of some exiles, and the emboldening of some dissident voices.  These 
prominent, would-be leaders of the rebellion gathered in Benghazi, where 
demonstrators had forced out Qaddafi loyalists.  We do not know exactly how 
these prominent Libyans jockeyed with each other to be heard and to gain a 
following in the crucial first days, but some subset does appear to have reached   30 
an agreement among themselves to claim leadership of the rebellion.  The initial 
core may have recruited allies and elbowed out adversaries, but at some point a 
relatively stable coterie was speaking with one voice.  By meshing their aims and 
plans, they constituted the shared group of prominent rebels; the participants 
who constituted this group were conscripted by consent.  Though the stakes 
were enormously higher, the process of group formation was probably no more 
complex than face-to-face schoolyard coalition-building and snubbing.  Their 
shared aim was to lead the rebellion.  That, of course, did not make them the 
rebellion’s leaders, or give them one shred of normative control over anyone but 
each other.  But, like a string quartet, they did constitute a normative group 
capable of responsible action. 
What of the demonstrators themselves?  Those who took to the streets 
ought to have quickly recognized that they were engaging in a mutually 
advantageous cooperative venture whose aim was the reform or overthrow of 
Qaddafi’s regime.  Because the venture met with partial success, we can suppose 
that rules of coordination emerged among the crowd: when and how to 
communicate with each other, when and how to stand firm, when and how to 
retreat.  So those who shared in these ends and shared in these means constituted 
a limited purpose group agent who performed the shared action of 
demonstrating.  It is unlikely that they formed a competent agent with adequate 
capacities for unified, reason-guided action—surely they were unable to mesh 
their aims and plans with the unity of a string quartet—but nor did they simply 
remain a crowd.  Rather, they formed a normative group, albeit an impaired one.   
Who was conscripted into this shared agent?  It is not necessary to 
suppose that only those demonstrators who voluntarily agreed that these be the 
rules of engagement and coordination count as members of the normative group.  
It is enough that these spontaneous conventions of coordination governed a great   31 
many of the demonstrators, and that the demonstration’s success depended on a 
great many continuing to be governed by these conventions.  Fairness would 
then require that a demonstrator who aimed at the demonstration’s success and 
voluntarily engaged in protest side-by-side with those who were governed by 
the rules of engagement also be governed by these rules of engagement, and 
therefore count as a conscript to the group. 
To be clear:  on this argument, no one was obligated to demonstrate.  But 
those who did demonstrate were conscripted as constitutive members of the 
group agent of demonstrators in virtue of their voluntarily sharing in the benefits 
of the coordination of others.  I do not need to go so far as to say that the fair play 
principle obligates the voluntary demonstrator to comply with the cooperative 
rules.  All I need to say is here is that, in virtue of the fair play principle, 
voluntary demonstrators are normatively governed in some way by those rules, 
and that makes them participants in a (somewhat impaired) group agent.   
What does it mean to be governed without necessarily being obligated?  If 
A has a moral power with respect to B in context C, B correlatively faces a moral 
liability.  What is this liability?  B is liable to changes in his normative situation.  
Such changes could be a duty not to interfere with A (that is, a recognition of A’s 
immunity), liability to A’s use of force or coercion, liability to changes in one’s 
rights against third parties, or liability to changes in normatively significant 
social facts.  None of these normative changes are the same as being morally 
obligated to comply with A’s commands.17  
  Meanwhile, Misurata and the towns surrounding Tripoli that had initial 
success in throwing out government forces were under siege, suffering shelling 
  
17 See Applbaum, ―Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey.‖   32 
and bombing by Qaddafi loyalists.  No case of practical necessity is clearer: the 
physical survival of the residents of these towns was in jeopardy, and each 
individual had the same compelling aim of staying alive.  The means to staying 
alive almost certainly demanded some level of organization and coordination: 
barricades needed to be manned, fires extinguished, wounds stanched.  Insofar 
as these residents are guided by reason, if they will to survive, they must will the 
necessary means to survive.  Add the usual universalization requirement that 
one may not make of oneself a special case, for we are not so foolish as to try to 
derive morality from rational self-interest alone.  Then any modestly effective 
coordination mechanism that emerged is something the residents of these towns 
were reasonably compelled to join.  This is no factual prediction: some may have 
cowered in basements or profiteered on the black market.  And the conscription 
of others may be overdetermined, for they may also have consented, or have 
voluntarily accepted offices in the resistance.  But voluntary acts are not 
necessary to conscript the residents of a besieged town to its common defense.   
 
21.  Consider now, more briefly, group agency in the Libyan rebellion constituted 
by representation.  Following Hobbes, the wills of a multitude of authors can be 
unified in the person of their representative.  Civil servants in Benghazi faced a 
choice: should they remain loyal to Qaddafi, or show up in the morning to work 
for the self-appointed rebel leaders?  If they showed up to work, then they 
helped to constitute the emerging rebel institution of governance.  Now at a scale 
larger than the face-to-face sharing of aims, this wider institution was constituted 
by representation:  the individual wills of the rebel civil servants were 
represented by the rebel leaders, and insofar as civil servants took supervision 
from the leaders, they were demonstrating the effectiveness of this 
representation.  How were the civil servants conscripted into the rebel   33 
institution?  For many, their showing up for work tokened consent, but for all, 
their continued voluntary acceptance of the benefits of office connect them as 
participants in group agency by way of fair play, whether or not they consented. 
  A similar story can be told about rebel army units.  Most were comprised 
of enthusiastic, untrained, poorly equipped young men.  Some were defectors 
from Qaddafi’s forces.  For the uprising to have succeeded beyond a few days, 
they needed to have been organized under some command.  Somehow, local 
commanders emerged.  We know that, at the top, military command of the rebels 
was less than perfectly unified because generals were squabbling over the top 
post.  But that did not prevent local units from constituting local group agents, 
unified by a commanding officer by way of representation.  How are individual 
soldiers conscripted into the normative group of a fighting unit?  All showed up 
to fight by consent.  They need not, however, have consented to the command 
structure that emerged.  Some may have shown up at the front having only the 
vaguest notions of military command and control.  But a military venture cannot 
succeed unless it is organized as a rule-governed cooperative scheme, and the 
more disciplined among them did just that, subjecting themselves to the 
command of those who had the experience or nerve to put themselves forth as 
officers, thereby constituting a group agent via representation.  At that point, a 
fighter who is voluntarily at the front can no longer go it alone.  Consenting or 
not, he is conscripted into the shared agent through the fair play principle, and is 
normatively governed by the local commanding officer who represents the will 
of the group.  In the heat of an existential battle, he is conscripted by practical 
necessity as well. 
 
22.  As the institutional structures of the rebellion expanded, solidified and 
matured, constitution by procedure took hold.  When the self-appointed informal   34 
rebel leaders announced that they had become the self-appointed Transitional 
National Council, they were not simply giving themselves a fancy title.  They 
were, as well, adopting procedures of decisionmaking for themselves and for 
those civil servants and fighters who took them as their representative.  So 
meshed aims and plans as a route to constitute group agency among the rebel 
leaders was partly supplemented and partly replaced by a set of procedures to 
unify their capacities of considering, willing, and doing.  How competent these 
procedures were is uncertain.  But it is clear that, if the normative group that was 
the rebellion was to expand to cover cooperating civil servants and army units in 
the field,  formality and complexity of constitution would be needed.  The 
members of the Transitional National Council conscripted themselves to their 
own enterprise by consent.  Once a large scale mutually advantageous 
cooperative venture of rebellion and governance is up and running, consent is 
not the only route of conscription.  Imagine the situation of rebel army officers.  
Having volunteered for their positions and opportunities, it does not matter 
whether they have consented to join a normative group led by the Transitional 
National Council.  The procedures of the council speak for them because they 
would be taking unfair advantage of the cooperative efforts of others if the 
council did not speak for them. 
 
23. Consider an objection to employing the principle of fair play to conscript 
membership in normative groups.18  The fair play argument, as developed by 
Rawls, shows how one can acquire an obligation through the voluntary 
acceptance of the benefits of a cooperative scheme even if one has not consented 
  
18 I am grateful to Frances Kamm for raising this question.   35 
to be obligated.  Rawls himself retreated from the claim that fair play creates 
obligation to obey the law because most of us are not free to voluntarily accept or 
reject the benefits of political society.  Do the actors that I imagine could be 
conscripted through fair play—demonstrators, Benghazi civil servants, rebel 
army soldiers and officers—voluntarily accept the benefits created by the group 
agent to which they are supposedly conscripted?  But some cannot avoid the 
benefits the group agent confers: a demonstrator may have done nothing to seek 
safety in numbers, though the crowd makes him safer.  Others have no 
acceptable alternative to accepting the benefits: a soldier who rejects coordination 
on the battlefield puts his life in danger.  Worse still, some are coerced by the 
group agent into accepting benefits because the group agent itself has rendered 
the actor’s alternatives unacceptable: a civil servant may show up to work for the 
rebels because the rebels have made his preferred alternative, working for the 
Qaddafi regime, fatal. 
  The answer to this objection is built of several steps.  First, note that I have 
been employing conceptions of freedom, consent, voluntariness, and coercion 
that are practical, not metaphysical, and partly normative, not purely descriptive 
or psychological.  Consider the paradigmatic example of fair play: neighbors 
who form a cooperative venture to dig a new community well.  If Adilah draws 
water from the well, the principle of fair play obligates her to do her fair share in 
the well’s upkeep according to the rules of the cooperative venture, even if she 
has not consented to do so.  But suppose that the neighbors who dug the new 
well wrongfully dumped the waste rock down Adilah’s own well, blocking it.  If 
Adilah has been deprived by her neighbors of a source of water to which she is 
entitled, then drawing water from the new well does not satisfy the criterion of 
voluntary acceptance of benefit under the fair play principle.  The neighbors 
violate Adilah’s moral baseline by destroying her well.  On a normative   36 
conception of coercion, if she then consents to join the new cooperative, such 
consent is coerced.  Similarly, if she does not consent but merely draws the 
water, her acceptance of benefit is not voluntary on a normative conception of 
voluntariness.  To assess whether the neighbors present Adilah with a coercive 
threat or a voluntary offer, we do not compare the benefit of proposed 
membership in the cooperative scheme to Adilah’s descriptive alternative, which 
is to go thirsty, but to the alternative morally owed to her by the neighbors, 
which not to damage her well.19  Similarly, in asking if Libyan demonstrators, 
civil servants, and soldiers voluntarily accept the benefits of a cooperative 
scheme, whether they have benefited and whether the benefit has been 
voluntarily accepted is assessed in comparison with their normative baselines—
how they ought to be treated—not their descriptive baselines—how they will be 
treated.  Unlike Adilah, who has a prior entitlement to the water of her own well, 
Qaddafi’s civil servants have no prior entitlement to a comfortable job in a 
tyrannical regime.  So, though the rebellion worsens the civil servants’ 
descriptive alternative to accepting the benefits of working for the rebels by 
eliminating the option of working for Qaddafi in safety, this worsening need not 
violate the civil servants’ normative baseline.  On a moralized conception of 
coercion, coming to work for the rebels in the morning is indeed the voluntary 
acceptance of benefit on a normative conception of voluntariness. 
  How far does this appeal to moralized baselines go?  If, as Kant holds, in a 
lawless condition every individual is subject to unilateral domination by every 
other, one might think that all of our interactions in a state of nature are mutually 
coercive, and so incapable of being genuinely consensual or voluntary in a 
  
19 See Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton University Press, 1987), for the normative 
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normative sense.  We are capable of psychological voluntariness, of course, in 
that it is possible to intentionally and successfully act on our desires.  We can 
also be held responsible for our actions, in the sense that we can act in ways that 
are morally appraisable as blameworthy or praiseworthy (on those moral 
reasons, perhaps attenuated, that apply to us in a state of nature).  But one might 
think that we cannot consensually obligate ourselves in a state of nature, and that 
wherever obligation via consent is impossible, obligation via fair play also is 
impossible, on the same ground.  This, however, is an extravagant conclusion: 
normatively voluntary action is possible in a lawless condition.  The normative 
upshot of mutual domination is not so drastic. 
  Outside of a civil condition, our rights are insecure in three ways: they 
cannot be legislated, they cannot be adjudicated, and there is no assurance that 
they will be enforced.20  Because of these three defects, all agreements in a 
lawless condition are inherently unstable, and some may be so unstable that 
some offers will never be made, and if made, never accepted.  But it does not 
follow that the genuine acceptance of an offer or of a benefit is conceptually or 
practically impossible.  If someone has trusted you and performed first on an 
agreement, you cannot ordinarily claim lack of assurance or of adjudication as a 
justification for not performing second, at least on your unilateral interpretation 
of what performance requires.  Yes, there is a sense in which we all wrong each 
other all of the time in a state of nature because we are failing in our duty to force 
each other into a civil condition.  But I have not put you in this lawless condition 
and I cannot, on my own, remove you from it.  Our situation is more like two 
would-be contractors who face an unjust background that neither has created.  If 
  
20 See Ripstein, Force and Freedom.   38 
A steals B’s bicycle, that wrongful act does not disable B from contracting to buy 
C’s bicycle.  In the ―smaller moral world‖ that exists between potential 
cooperators in a state of nature, the background condition of enduring coercion 
may be bracketed for many purposes.21  
  In one respect, establishing voluntariness in a lawless condition may be 
easier, rather than harder, than in a lawful condition.  Without lawgiving and 
adjudication, what one is entitled to in a state of nature is underdetermined and 
therefore one’s normative baseline is underdetermined.  In a lawful condition, 
the moral baseline is shaped by what is allowed by actual legitimate law.  In a 
lawless condition, what counts as a coercive threat rather than merely sharp 
bargaining is, in part, underdetermined.  One should not exaggerate: the state of 
nature is not a morality-free zone.  But unlike in a lawful condition, where there 
is a presumption, rebuttable to be sure, of a rough correspondence between ex 
ante empirical baselines and normative baselines, there is no such presumption 
in a lawless condition.  
  Finally, recall that to conscript an actor into membership in a group agent, 
we do not need to establish that the actor is morally obligated to obey the 
directives of the group agent.  Rather, all we need to establish is the weaker claim 
that the actor is liable to the normative power of the group agent—that the group 
agent legitimately governs the actor over some scope and in some jurisdiction of 
action.  Recall again the constitutive properties of a normative group: an entity 
that is the proximate locus of respect and responsibility in virtue of its capacity 
for unified considering, deciding, and doing.  An agent does not need to be 
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Reasons We Can Share,‖ in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge University Press, 
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morally obligated to obey group decisions in order for her individual actions to 
function as contributions to unified considering, deciding, and willing.  Nor does 
an agent need to be morally obligated to obey in order to share, in some way, in 
the rights and responsibilities of the group that are distributed over its natural 
members.  For those who still are repelled by the idea that one can be 
conscripted, without consent, into membership in a group, observe that 
membership entails, not moral obligation, but moral liability.  A normative 
group, to be a normative group, need only claim the normative power to create 
and change the normative situation of its members in some ways, not in all ways.  
A group creates and changes institutional rights and duties in ways that change 
its members’ moral liabilities.  But this is just to say that the moral rights and 
responsibilities of normative groups are distributed over the natural actors that 
are members of the group.   
 
24.  The astute reader will have noted that I left the most difficult cells for last.  I 
have shown how the institutions of rebellion can emerge, constituting, by the 
various routes of meshed aims, representation, and procedure, a group agent 
that conscripts rebels as its members.  But a similar mechanism can account for 
the emergence of a Mafia crime family, the Church of Scientology, or Qaddafi’s 
dictatorship.  None legitimately govern a political people.  What, if anything, 
connects the willing rebels and their institutions to all Libyans?  What, if 
anything, can make the Transitional National Council’s claim to be ―the only 
legitimate body representing the people of Libya and the Libyan state‖ true? 
  We can rule out some answers.  An entire people cannot constitute a 
normative group by the route of meshed aims and plans.  No multitude at that 
scale can share the range of aims that must be set by a government, let alone 
mesh their plans to act as one.  Only in a much smaller domain—a more limited   40 
context C—is unity without institutional structure possible.  Nor can an entire 
people be conscripted into a normative group by way of consent.  As said earlier, 
this is not simply an empirical claim, but most often a conceptual one.  For 
almost everyone, consent in medias res cannot be genuine, because almost all find 
themselves without alternatives to life in one coercive regime or another.  One 
can endorse one’s political arrangements, and when we endorse morally 
endorsable political arrangements, we have reached, in Rawls’s lovely but 
obscure phrase, ―the outer limit of our freedom.‖22  But if consent is a transaction 
between independent wills, endorsement of an unavoidable condition does not 
count as consent. 
Ab ovo, however, attempts at consent occur against the backdrop of 
natural freedom in a state of nature.  Why cannot such attempts conceptually 
succeed?  Over a smaller domain—a smaller context C, not fewer contractors—I 
have supposed that they can: the rebel leaders are assumed to have conscripted 
themselves to their joint plans through mutual consent.  But, despite the 
obviously grave and widespread consequences of a rebellion, the joint project of 
a rebellion’s instigators is quite limited, when properly understood.  Their joint 
actions are instrumental and time-bound: to drive out Qaddafi and bring about 
the conditions under which a much greater process of constitution and 
conscription can occur.  Legitimate collective self-governance is a condition in 
which three powers that every natural person has—the power to make one’s 
own law, the power to interpret one’s own law, and the power to coercively 
enforce one’s own law—are combined in such a way that these powers are 
exercised together, not unilaterally.  Any smaller contract that is executed under 
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conditions of legitimate governance is constrained to comply with legitimate law.  
A smaller contract that is executed outside of conditions of legitimate 
governance—that is, in a state of nature—takes lawlessness as the background 
condition of things, but is not itself an attempted solution to lawlessness.  The 
subject matter of smaller contracts is not the replacement of unilateral judgment 
and coercion by collective self-governance.  When the rebel leaders successfully 
form the Transitional National Council, they are neither constituting collective 
self-governance for all Libyans (despite their claims), nor constituting a tiny 
lawful condition among a couple of dozen middle-aged men.  They retain 
whatever natural rights of judgment and coercion they have in a state of nature.  
So what they consent to is quite shallow.  There is no fundamental difference 
between a dozen persons in a state of nature consenting to start a revolution 
together and consenting to go to a movie together.  Any such group agent is 
unstable and unenforceable, but factually possible to realize.  Just as the movie-
goers might find that they have succeeded in acting together to ―go to a movie,‖ 
so too the rebel leaders might find that they have succeeded in acting together to 
―overthrow Qaddafi,‖ or to ―set the conditions for the constitution of legitimate 
government.‖  But they cannot, on their own, ―constitute legitimate 
government.‖  That can be the collective achievement of all Libyans only.  Now 
one can see why collective self-governance ab ovo cannot be achieved through 
consent.  A state of nature is a state of mutual domination, where each, as a self-
legislator and self-judge, is entitled to coerce each.  So a choice to replace this 
coercive lawless condition with a coercive lawful condition is no more 
consensual than the in medias res choice to accept the existing coercive lawful 
condition that one cannot avoid.  Hence the conclusion that one can consent to go 
to the movies in both a state of nature and in a lawful condition, but one cannot 
consent to be in a lawful condition in either.   42 
Fair play will not connect all Libyans to the Transitional National Council 
for much the same reason that consent will not.  As Rawls ultimately recognized, 
ordinary citizens cannot voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually 
advantageous scheme of social cooperation when they cannot refuse the benefits.  
Those who seek offices, positions, and other advantages from institutions and 
practices constituted by others may thereby count as constituent members 
themselves, but this condition does not hold for all. 
 
25.  On the view proposed here, a government has political legitimacy only when 
it is a free group agent constituted by the free natural agents whom it governs, 
where freedom is understood as competence and independence.  Two ways 
remain to achieve legitimate governance: conscripting all of the governed 
through practical necessity to constitute a group agent by representation, and 
conscripting all of the governed through practical necessity to constitute a group 
agent by procedure.  Earlier, I invoked practical necessity to conscript survivors 
of shipwrecks and victims of siege warfare into normative groups constituted for 
their survival.  Is it not extravagant to claim that we are all, always, equally 
compelled by reason to be citizens?  Hobbes may be right about nasty and 
brutish, but surely he exaggerates with short: anarchy is not invariably fatal.   
The demands of practical necessity, however, are not limited to existential 
threats.  Recall the formulation of a practical necessity: something that is 
constitutive of or a precondition for acting upon a moral agent’s prior 
commitments that the agent either cannot or will not give up.  A moral agent 
cannot possibly give up a commitment to internal freedom, understood as 
competence in the capacities of considering, willing, and doing, and still count as 
a moral agent.  External freedom, understood as independence from domination, 
is in some measure at least a precondition for, and arguably constitutive of,   43 
internal freedom, for without bodily integrity and liberty of thought and 
expression, self-governing action is not possible.  So it is not extravagant to 
conclude that institutions and procedures that guarantee freedom are practical 
necessities, as shown in the bottom right cell of Table 4.  The offer of legitimate 
government—that is, the offer of institutions in which we are free enough to 
have the capacity to be authors of procedures and collective actions and that 
realize and protect the freedoms that make us free enough to have the capacity to 
be authors—is an offer we cannot refuse.   
  Is it possible to refuse something less?  A benevolent despotism might 
offer its subjects something short of active citizenship.  It might provide the rule 
of law, realize basic human rights, and promote the wellbeing of all, but be 
unwilling or unable to make the subjects of its decent-enough rule active authors 
of their own governance.  If we are to consider a society governed by a 
benevolent despotism as a form of group agency, it can only be conceived as 
subjects constituted by representation and conscripted by practical necessity.  
This describes the remaining cell in Table 4, but like hypothesized elements on 
the bottom row of the Periodic Table, it may not exist in nature.  The problem is 
that, as described, the situation does not call for any action or transaction on the 
part of subjects at all, so there is nothing about the subject’s will that is practically 
necessary.  True, all subjects need the freedom that the despot provides (and 
more), but there is no need for the joining of wills to realize that freedom.  
Someone who gives me a gift may gratify my wish, but does not represent my 
will.  The subjects of benevolent despots are, collectively, patients, not agents.  
Perhaps they form a group patient that bears respect, but not a group agent that 
bears responsibility.  As a normative group they are, at best, seriously impaired. 
  What then has to be the case for Libya’s rebel Transitional National 
Council to be the only legitimate body representing the people of Libya?  They   44 
have to be in a position to make an offer that the people of Libya cannot refuse—a 
self-enacting offer that, once made, makes it the case that all Libyans are 
collectively self-governing, competent and independent citizens.  Nothing is like 
that ab ovo. 
  This is not, however, a reason to despair.  The other eight cells of the table 
hint at what governance by the Transitional National Council might be like in 
medias res.  So, though no assertion of political legitimacy is self-enacting, some 
assertions of political legitimacy can be self-fulfilling.  Over time, first through 
small-scale consent and meshed aims and plans, then through fair play and 
representation, the actions of the rebel leaders conscript more Libyans into 
normative groups constituted for more encompassing contexts.  The day may 
then arrive, after many tendentious assertions of the legitimating power of 
impossible consent of the governed through procedures of fantasized pedigree, 
that the people of Libya are free enough to participate in political institutions that 
make them free.  And that will be enough.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 